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European economic integration drives a political economy of region-
alism that – far more than traditional divisions between labour and 
capital – defines the principal axis of political-economic division in 
the New Europe. The New Economy drives a radical shift in EU pol-
icy from cohesion or redistribution toward innovation promotion, af-
fecting distributional struggles and policy approaches at the EU, na-
tional and subnational levels. Shifting strategies pose significant chal-
lenges at the national and subnational levels with important implica-
tions for future EU, national and subnational economic and regional 
development policy goals. At the national level, and in particular less 
developed economies, the New Economy creates incentives for the 
increasing centralization of decision-making. EU-level reforms, such 
as the Lisbon Agenda and an increasing emphasis on cohesion as 
opposed to structural funding, do much to strengthen these trends. 
Subnational regions, at least in the near term, may be the principal 
losers. But such trends are likely to strengthen future demands for 
greater subnational political decentralization.  
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Increasing economic integration in the 
European context places national govern-
ments and subnational regional entities at 
odds with each other – in particular in 
the less developed economies of Europe. 
Market integration drives greater concen-
tration of economic activity in the more 
advanced regions of Europe and as well 
as in the more advanced areas of the 
New Member states. Increased differentia-
tion on the basis of economic geography 
drives the rise of national and subnational 
economic and political regionalism. The 
consequences of economic geography are 
multiple, pitting more and less advanced 
national governments against each other – 
in particular though not exclusively in the 
struggle over EU Structural and Cohesions 
Funds (SCF’s, the subject of a companion 
paper)1 – and pitting national governments 
against subnational regional entities (the 
subject of this paper). 
This paper asks what factors create the 
foundation for the implementation of 
greater political decentralization and/or 
regional autonomy. Previous authors have 
argued that demands for greater subna-
tional regional autonomy are driven by 
such factors as democratization and poten-
tially ethnic identity, the carrot of EU 
benefits (structural and cohesion funds), 
the power and influence of the European 
Commission (in particular as a tool to 
weaken states), and broader phenomena 
such as globalization. Ohmae (1993) ar-
gued that economically successful regions 
                                                 
1 This struggle emerges on many levels, but is 
perhaps most visible at the level of debates over 
the EU’s SCF’s (Ellison, 2007). However, this strug-
gle has also triggered EU-wide debates over na-
tional and EU-level corporate taxation and competi-
tion policies (Ellison, forthcoming). 
are emboldened by failed governance at 
the national level and the potential re-
wards of political autonomy at the re-
gional level. More recently, Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997) have argued that integra-
tion into supranational institutional frame-
works – in particular those strengthening 
trade relations – reduces dependence on 
the state and emboldens demands for 
greater regional autonomy. 
I argue that national governments – in 
particular in the less developed EU econo-
mies – are placed at odds with subna-
tional regional entities due to the chal-
lenges of the emerging economic geogra-
phy. States at lower levels of economic 
development are subject to cohesion and 
convergence demands at both the national 
and regional levels and are thus likely 
torn between competing demands. National 
governments are likely to respond by 
promoting the degree of political and eco-
nomic centralization – in particular where 
economic planning and the distribution of 
resources are concerned. The rise of the 
exogenous economy characterized by 
strong vertical integration with the West 
European marketplace now places CEE 
governments before the challenge of 
strengthening ties between foreign and 
domestic firms, strengthening R&D net-
works and building domestic potential for 
innovation promotion. 
Subnational regional entities – in par-
ticular where subnational regional re-
sources are threatened by centralized in-
terests and projects – are likely to push 
for greater political decentralization and 
decision-making autonomy. Such subna-
tional regionalism may take on different 
forms in different regions depending on 
the level of economic development and the 
degree of dependence upon centralized 
state level authorities. Where national and 
regional level interests coincide, i.e. where 
interests in the development of innovation 
promotion and the building of ties be-
tween foreign and domestic firms are 
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compatible with regional interests, demands 
for greater political decentralization and 
regional decision-making autonomy will be 
muted. But these interests are likely to be 
less compatible in the less developed re-
gions of Hungary. In this case, the carrot 
of EU SCF resources may potentially drive 
a wedge between national governments 
and regional entities – in particular where 
such resources create prospects for 
greater regional independence and auton-
omy.  
The development of subnational region-
alism, however, is also impacted by the 
domestic political context. Two factors 
stand out. One is the role of regional 
identity – or the lack thereof – and its 
potential for creating divisions between 
central and regional governance. Demands 
for greater regional autonomy and politi-
cal decentralization may gain strength with 
time. But without a strong sense of iden-
tity based on ethnicity or language differ-
ences, complete secession will not likely be 
pursued. The second is the role of existing 
political institutions. In the Hungarian 
case, the emerging two-party system fuels 
the degree of political polarization between 
central elites and regional actors. More-
over, polarization impedes the role of local 
politicians, since the degree of party disci-
pline common to parliamentary systems 
creates barriers for local actors with fu-
ture political ambitions. 
1) PARADIGM SHIFT? 
COHESION, REDISTRIBUTION 
AND INNOVATION PROMOTION 
In the broader theoretical literature, ex-
planations for why governments choose to 
decentralize power vary from democratiza-
tion, the carrot of EU benefits (structural 
and cohesion funds), the power and influ-
ence of the European Commission (in par-
ticular as a tool to weaken states), to 
even broader phenomena such as global-
ization. There is, however, a considerable 
degree of variation in the relative degree 
of decentralization and also in the impor-
tance of the regions among the old EU 
member states as well. Very few EU mem-
ber states have strong regions. Belgium, 
Germany, Spain and the UK (Wales and 
Scotland) appear to be the exceptions. For 
the most part regions are generally weakly 
developed in the member states (Le Galès 
and Lequesne, 1998). Despite attempts by 
the European Commission to strengthen 
regional government as a form of institu-
tional leverage over the power of EU 
member states, the formation of powerful 
regions lags expectations. Thus the more 
relevant research question may be when 
and why central governments are likely to 
relinquish more control over the ambitions 
of regions. 
A broad scale rewriting of industrial 
and regional development goals has been 
afoot in the European Union for some 
time. The Sapir Report dealt a consider-
able blow to previous regional policy ini-
tiatives. Since that time, DGRegio appears 
pinned between the competing agendas of 
regional development and the onslaught of 
growth and competitiveness and Lisbon 
Agenda policy orientations.2 This intellec-
tual and political economic debate is evi-
dence that New Economy models cast new 
light on the geography and driving forces 
of economic growth and development. Ob-
servations from this literature have reper-
cussions both for theorizing about the 
shape and substance of EU, national and 
                                                 
2 A book-length Danish Technological Institute 
(2005) study commissioned by DGRegio was dedi-
cated to exploring the compatibility between re-
gional development and Lisbon goals. Most re-
cently, Regional Policy Commissioner Danuta Hüb-
ner has spent considerable time giving speeches on 
the significance of Lisbon goals for regional devel-
opment. See, for example, the series of speeches 




subnational-level regional policy tools and 
goals,3 as well as the institutional frame-
work within which they are formulated. 
One of the principal contributions of the 
New Economy Models with respect to re-
gional policy and national (or suprana-
tional) development goals is to question the 
nature of the linkage between regional, 
subnational development policy and the 
nature and structure of economic growth 
and development. In particular, the litera-
ture on the equity vs. efficiency tradeoffs 
of economic intervention, industrial policy 
and regional development strategies high-
lights both the challenge and problems of 
formulating compatible regional and na-
tional level economic policy goals. 
New Economy models designate the mix 
of endogenous growth and economic ge-
ography models popularized in particular 
by Romer (1994), Krugman (1991) and 
Lucas (1990). External increasing returns4 
derive from the geographic clustering of 
firms. Economic geography models in par-
ticular highlight the territorial nature of 
localized factors generating technological 
progress. Territorial effects arise both 
from local spillovers generated by the 
geographic concentration of economic ac-
tivity, as well as from factors limiting the 
potential geographic range over which 
knowledge or technological progress is 
spread (see Leamer and Storper, 2001; 
Scott, 2000; Martin, 1999; Storper, 1992). 
Theoretical controversy remains over what 
specific factors ultimately drive external 
increasing returns, ranging from the Mar-
shallian effects related variation in the size 
of the available labour pool (Krugman, 
1991), to informal informational exchanges 
                                                 
3 See in particular Bachtler and Wishlade (2005), 
Martin (2003), and Baldwin and Martin (2004). 
4 Krugman’s (1991) distinguishes in particular be-
tween increasing returns resulting from firm-level 
economies of scale and external increasing returns 
generated by the geographic concentration of eco-
nomic activity. The implications of the latter are 
the focus of this analysis. 
(Leamer and Storper, 2001; Scott, 2000; 
Storper, 1992;) to variation in the level 
and share of human capital (Lucas, 1990; 
Romer, 1994). Empirical evidence suggests 
the most significant impact of globalization 
and economic integration is regional varia-
tion in levels of economic development, in 
particular at the subnational level (Sala-I-
Martin, 2002; Martin, 1999; and Quah, 
1996), a phenomenon that is perhaps best 
explained by New Economy type models of 
economic development. 
For the purposes of this article, New 
Economy models cast new light both on 
the forces driving economic growth and 
development and on their territorial im-
pact. Observations from this literature 
have repercussions both for theorizing 
about the shape and substance of EU, na-
tional and subnational-level regional policy 
tools and goals,5 as well as the institu-
tional framework within which they are 
formulated. A principal contribution of the 
New Economy Models is to question the 
linkage between regional development pol-
icy and the nature and structure of the 
factors promoting economic growth and 
development (Martin, 1999). Theories of 
economic geography and endogenous 
growth promote increasing attention to 
regional clustering and the promotion of 
regional, geographically-localized spillovers. 
In doing so, they have two potentially det-
rimental implications for conventional re-
gional development policies. First, they fo-
cus attention on pre-existing geographic 
concentrations of economic activity – in 
particular regions that are more economi-
cally advanced. And second, by promoting 
innovation-promotion oriented policies, they 
draw attention away from redistributive-
type policies. 
The nature and structure of European, 
macro-level and regional development 
                                                 
5 See in particular Bachtler and Wishlade (2005), 
Martin (2003), and Baldwin and Martin (2004). 
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goals has undergone considerable revision 
in the past two decades. European eco-
nomic policy goals have exhibited a grad-
ual shift away from their previous sectoral 
structure and direct redistribution (e.g. 
subsidies to firms and the support of de-
clining industries, income support and the 
like). Emphasis is now placed on more 
horizontal forms of assistance with broad 
application, in particular on the role of 
physical and human capital (or infrastruc-
ture, R&D, training and education).6 Re-
form of EU regional development goals 
follows in the footsteps of these economic 
policy reforms. Intentionally or not, the 
Sapir Report dealt a considerable blow to 
previous regional policy initiatives. Since 
that time, DGRegio appears pinned be-
tween the competing agendas of regional 
development and the onslaught of growth 
and competitiveness and Lisbon Agenda 
policy orientations. 
Though the radical shift in development 
strategies and goals is perhaps only mod-
erately perceptible, what is being ques-
tioned is the long tradition of EU and na-
tional level policy orientations focusing re-
sources on agriculture, declining industries 
and lagging regions.7 As many argue, if 
Europe is to become more competitive, it 
must shift more resources to more com-
petitive economic activities. Following 
Streeck (1999), this is part of a more 
generalizable phenomenon occurring at the 
level of the state as well. Streeck empha-
sizes the current national government 
practice of promoting productive assets 
(physical and human capital, education, 
R&D, infrastructure, etc.) at the expense 
of redistributional spending (transfer pay-
                                                 
6 Early discussion of the shift toward horizontal 
measures can be found in “Industrial Policy in an 
Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for 
a Community Approach” (COM(90) 556) and “An 
Industrial Competitiveness Policy for the EU” 
(COM(94) 319 final). 
7 This point is clear from the Sapir report (Euro-
pean Commission, 2003: 79, 126). 
ments, unemployment insurance and other 
forms of income maintenance). Competi-
tiveness concerns drive a broad re-
orientation of economic management 
strategies. Moreover, this phenomenon is 
occurring at both the supranational EU, 
national and subnational level of policy-
making. 
The specifically regional character of 
shifting policy orientations is less obvious. 
Yet New Economy models prompt a com-
paratively radical rethinking in particular 
of the compatibility of national and sub-
national regional policy goals. These mod-
els have focused attention both on the im-
portance of agglomeration economies and 
their clustering of economic activity, as 
well as on the importance of regions inso-
far as such clustering tends to exhibit a 
particularly regional character. One should 
not however confuse (as some of the lit-
erature appears to do) the focus on the 
regional clusters of economic activity with 
the previous focus on regional policy and 
regional development in the less advanced 
regions of Europe. The New Economy 
model is focused on promoting dynamic 
regional growth – in particular in regions 
exhibiting a positive propensity to support 
such growth – while the other is more 
clearly focused on an attempt to reverse 
patterns of economic decline. The outcome 
is likely to be an increasing degree of 
competition between growth promoting and 
cohesion inducing public policy goals or, 
as phrased at the outset of this article, 
between innovation-oriented and redistribu-
tive policy goals. Moreover, this competi-
tion exhibits a decidedly territorial charac-
ter. 
The prospects of Europe’s less devel-
oped regions are further frustrated by 
significant regional variation in long-term 
levels of economic development. Repeated 
failures to turn some regions around (e.g. 
the Italian Mezzogiorno and East Ger-
many), propel many to ask why EU or 
national level resources should be allocated 
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to policies that do not always bear fruit.8 
A number of authors thus point to equity 
vs. efficiency trade-offs with respect to 
national and regional economic policy 
goals (Brakman et al., 2005; Bachtler et 
al., 2003; Martin, 1999). In their view, if 
agglomeration is crucial to the nature and 
character of economic development, then 
transferring resources to less developed 
regions is likely to slow the rate of eco-
nomic development in advanced regions 
and accordingly may – by diverting valu-
able resources – fail to achieve their de-
sired effect in less advanced regions. 
Revising policy approaches directed to-
ward less developed regions or reducing 
government intervention in regions on the 
decline are likely outcomes of such obser-
vations. In fact, promoting growth in the 
more developed regions is often seen as 
the key to promoting growth in the less 
advanced regions (see Brakman et al., 
2005; Scott, 2000). As Scott argues, “geo-
economic space” is made up of a “central 
nucleus” and a “hinterland” of variable 
size (2000: 48). Implicit is the notion that 
the welfare of more remote regions – 
though excruciatingly unclear where such 
regions begin and end9 – is dependent 
upon and pulled along by the welfare of 
the core regions. In this regard, New 
Economy models disadvantage redistributive 
policy and favour more targeted and po-
tentially more supply-side oriented policies 
focused on the development of human and 
physical capital (education, R&D and in-
frastructure), potentially diminishing the 
                                                 
8 For recent overviews of the literature on the 
relative success of regional policy, see Jouen (2005: 
Annex) and Funck and Pizzati (2003). 
9 One way of thinking about this problem is to 
ask how it fits the European case which Scott does 
not directly address. For example, should one think 
of central nuclei and a hinterland at the national, 
subnational or European level? The relevant unit of 
analysis here is terribly important in terms of its 
policy implications. 
regional cohesion and redistributive content 
of development policies. 
Efficiency motives provide strong incen-
tives for both national governments and 
regions to exercise greater control over 
economic development strategies. For na-
tional governments, both EU-based and 
national-level regional development strate-
gies – in particular those focused on co-
hesion and redistribution – potentially 
drain resources away from more advanced 
states and regions. While all states are 
broadly similar in this regard, the level of 
economic development across states gener-
ates variation in policy interests. For more 
advanced states, such observations drive 
an interest in promoting Lisbon-type objec-
tives over more traditional forms of re-
gional development. Lisbon-type objectives, 
however, embody implicit challenges, both 
to the interests of less developed states 
and regions and to the future of regional 
policy more generally.  
For less advanced states, regional devel-
opment goals are preferable to Lisbon-type 
strategies where this portends a greater 
concentration of funding on less developed 
states. At the same time however, in the 
domestic arena the specifically regional 
focus of regional development strategies 
may potentially draw resources away from 
emerging economic clusters and potentially 
upset the fine balance between regional 
and national level economic restructuring 
and overall economic development. If the 
dispersion of resources designed to pro-
mote overall development leads to an 
overall decline in rates of economic 
growth, national governments will then 
presumably favour agglomeration promot-
ing policies over regional redistribution. 
Less advanced states in particular are thus 
faced with significant equity vs. efficiency 
tradeoffs and are torn between the objec-
tives of cohesion/redistribution and innova-
tion promotion. 
 10 
Due to efficiency concerns, states in 
particular are likely to be torn between 
innovation promotion and cohesion/redis-
tribution and are also likely to favour 
greater centralization in the institutional 
structure that oversees the making of eco-
nomic management policies at the national 
level. Increasing demands for decentraliza-
tion (whether their origin is the Commis-
sion or the regions themselves), in particu-
lar over EU funds, are likely to be paral-
leled by increasing national government 
attempts to maintain control – at least as 
long as politically feasible. Less advanced 
states in particular have strong incentives 
to side with growth-club constituencies in 
the more advanced regions, since these 
are presumably more likely to attract im-
portant resources for the state – in par-
ticular government revenues and improved 
employment. 
The role of the EU and the subnational 
regional level in attempting to foster 
greater decentralization at the regional 
level may well be rendered somewhat am-
biguous in this general context.10 The cur-
rent trend – even in the framework of EU 
funding and the institutional management 
of these funds – seems to run in the op-
posite direction. For one, the EU has be-
gun shifting more of the redistributional 
funding away from the structural and to-
ward the cohesion elements of the SCF. 
This has the impact of increasing the role 
                                                 
10 For many reasons, DGRegio is likely to find it-
self in a considerable state of turmoil. For one, 
such a paradigm shift ultimately entails shifts in 
the policy constituencies and entrenched interests 
built up over time for the purposes of institutional 
survival. At the same time, both the phenomenon 
of paradigm shift and the EU’s changing member-
ship basis distinctly threaten older constituencies. In 
this regard, DGRegio is likely to be torn between 
competing interests. Moreover, some of this process 
is likely to be mirrored at the level of the state. 
The Hungarian case presents an interesting exam-
ple. Power was first shifted to the National Devel-
opment Office and only later shifted back to the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Devel-
opment. 
and importance of the state over the re-
gions. Moreover, while DGRegio has 
tended to emphasize the importance of 
regions, current efforts likewise place con-
siderable emphasis on the coordination of 
regional and state-level economic strate-
gies,11 once again pushing the emphasis 
toward the state level. For another, EU co-
financing requirements ultimately favour 
national level institutions, since approval of 
such funds tends to depend on national or 
ministry-level support for individual pro-
jects.12 Finally, despite an initial interest in 
greater decentralization, during the period 
2004-2006 the coordination and manage-
ment of EU SCF funding was primarily left 
up to CEE states. Left to their own devices 
– in particular with the advantage of in-
creased political centralization – states and 
national governments can more easily de-
cide how best to allocate resources across 
regions. Thus the EU’s indecisiveness and 
ambiguous approach to the politics of re-
gional development allocates much of the 
political struggle over economic policy 
strategies to the national arena. 
Efficiency motives are also likely to give 
rise to intense national level conflicts over 
resource distribution. The New Economy 
view of what drives economic growth 
raises explicit challenges for regions. Eco-
nomically more advanced regions, on the 
one hand, are likely to lobby national 
governments in favour of regional devel-
opment strategies that favour agglomera-
                                                 
11 The recommendation of the Danish Technological 
Institute’s (2005) report, for example, strongly 
recommended that in order to pool the synergies 
of regional and state-level economic development 
strategies – and in particular in order to make 
Lisbon type strategies more compatible with re-
gional development goals – it was important to 
coordinate and align them.  
12 Co-financing tools – for example the EU’s 50 
per cent co-financing requirement for structural 
funds is typically seen as a mechanism for forcing 
correspondence between regional and national level 
interests in economic development (e.g. Bachtler et 
al., 2003: 16).  
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tion and the development of greater inno-
vation potential. Such regions may be at 
the forefront of national-level autonomy 
drives, but are less likely to be strong 
supporters either of national or suprana-
tional EU-level redistribution toward less 
developed regions. On the other hand, in-
sofar as EU membership provides such 
regions with greater political autonomy 
and the ability to trade freely with the 
other regions of Europe, they are likely to 
be strong supporters of European integra-
tion.13 Economically less advanced regions, 
on the other hand, – in particular in the 
less advanced states – are likely to be-
come strong supporters both of more tra-
ditional forms of national-level and EU 
support and in particular of the EU redis-
tributional framework. In addition, they 
may potentially become strong advocates 
of political decentralization. Advocating 
political autonomy, however, is less likely 
in a context where such regions are de-
pendent upon the approval and resources 
of national governments – in particular 
for co-financing of EU-funded projects. But 
in the context of national government 
support for more advanced regional eco-
nomic clusters – less advanced regions – 
notwithstanding the ambiguities noted 
above with respect to EU-level loyalties14 – 
may eventually see the EU as a haven for 
the defense of regional interests and as a 
vehicle through which they can gain 
greater political control over resources. 
There are important caveats to the New 
Economy approach. For one, faster eco-
nomic growth in Europe’s peripheries ap-
                                                 
13 This is the beauty of Alesina and Spolaore’s 
(1997) argument  that as nations become more 
economically integrated – or as free trade deepens 
and becomes more widespread – there are increas-
ing incentives for regions to seek greater political 
autonomy from nation states. 
14 To the extent that the European Commission 
continues to lean in the direction of national-level 
control of EU-funding, this may greatly limit the 
ability and interest of less advanced regions in 
promoting their ties to the European Union. 
pears as a potential contradiction to New 
Economy models and provides some sup-
port for neoclassical approaches. Slow 
growth in Europe’s core has been one of 
the driving forces behind the interest in 
re-orienting European policy approaches 
toward the Lisbon agenda. While it is be-
yond the parameters of this paper to re-
spond adequately to this debate, even 
some of the more avid and astute propo-
nents of New Economy approaches provide 
occasionally contradictory data with sur-
prisingly little commentary. Martin, for 
example, builds an argument around the 
New Economy approach but then provides 
data to suggest that the peripheries grew 
more rapidly over the period 1995-1999 
(2003: 22).15  
Others have likewise noted that al-
though less advanced regions are fre-
quently assumed to benefit less from eco-
nomic integration and EU membership, the 
evidence to support this claim is at best 
mixed. Thus Hooghe and Keating, voice a 
degree of scepticism about the core-
periphery model (1994: 369). Such findings 
generate further uncertainty in the calcula-
tion of which regions are likely to win 
and lose from the process of economic 
integration and EU membership. Moreover, 
some countries and regions have met with 
considerably more success than others, 
suggesting that other factors also play a 
role – in particular, the specific institu-
tional features of individual countries and 
regions. Variation in the economic success 
of Irish, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek 
regions, for example, is difficult to explain 
only on the basis of EU-funding. 
                                                 
15 Martin does argue that while there is economic 
convergence across states, there is economic diver-
gence across Europe’s regions. However he essen-
tially neglects the larger question of what explains 
convergence across the states of Europe. 
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2) HUNGARY AND THE RISE OF 
THE EXOGENOUS ECONOMY 
The countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are faced both with the challenge 
of promoting a stable, functioning macro-
economic framework and with the di-
lemma of promoting successful regional 
economic development. Early discussion of 
the consequences of European integration 
focused almost exclusively on national level 
benefits to economic integration and little 
attention was devoted to the potential im-
pact of economic integration at the local 
or regional level in individual countries.16 
However, with the rapid increase in re-
gional disparities, regional development 
strategies have become increasingly impor-
tant. Many regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe have been devastated by the eco-
nomic transition and the rapid economic 
restructuring of some regions, leading to 
high levels of unemployment and cross-
regional wage disparities. At the same 
time, both democratization and the EU ac-
cession – in particular through the crea-
tion of NUTS II level regional administra-
tive entities and the distribution of EU 
structural funds – have encouraged the 
formation and development of regional 
entities that grow increasingly interested in 
developing their own capacity to promote 
                                                 
16 Bachtler et al., for example, note that ‘market 
economy based’ regional measures did not develop 
rapidly. More emphasis was placed instead on 
macro-level national economic variables (2003: 16). 
While this may overemphasize the degree to which 
the regional level was in fact neglected – many of 
the incentives schemes adopted in the mid to late 
90’s in countries like Hungary in fact offered quite 
generous rewards to investment in less developed 
regions (see Ellison, forthcoming) – there does ap-
pear to have been a far greater emphasis on na-
tional level economic development and a much 
weaker interest in regional economic development. 
regional development and administrate EU 
funding. 
The Central and East European coun-
tries are caught at an awkward juncture. 
On the one hand, they have – in particu-
lar the more advanced among them – 
achieved considerable progress in promot-
ing foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
economic growth. Most or all of the Cen-
tral and East European economies are now 
well integrated into the European market-
place, have dramatically boosted their 
overall levels of trade with the West and 
have received substantial FDI. On the 
other hand, as a number of authors have 
illustrated (Ellison, forthcoming; Pavlínek, 
2004), there is a growing gap between 
those firms that are now well integrated 
into European networks and those firms 
that remain on the fringe. This gap is to 
some extent commensurate with a distinc-
tion between foreign affiliates and domes-
tic firms or what some refer to as the 
dual economy. However, some domestic 
firms in CEE clearly benefit from their 
growing links to the West or from eco-
nomic and/or market transition more gen-
erally. 
EU membership and economic integra-
tion in the European marketplace rein-
forces and exacerbates the existing na-
tional-level economic geography. A fre-
quent complaint in Hungary is that FDI 
and the presence of foreign MNC’s has 
contributed generally to economic growth 
(a rise in productivity), to rising wages 
and to rising shares of Western oriented 
exports. But the share of R&D related ac-
tivity and thus, many contend, Hungary’s 
innovation potential is on the decline. For 
one, Hungary previously had far more 
substantial shares of R&D expenditure (in 
1988 these amounted to 2.3% of GDP but 
by 1996 they had fallen to 0.7% of GDP) 
(Havas, 2001: 11). For another, incoming 
MNC’s occasionally scaled back existing 
Hungarian R&D activities or transferred 
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some R&D activities to home bases (Sass, 
2004; Pavlínek, 2004).17  
While the complete picture here is more 
nuanced, many fear that high reliance on 
foreign-owned MNC’s is likely to reduce 
the share of Hungarian innovative poten-
tial, leading to a degree of path depend-
ence. The worst case scenario is that 
hopes for greater convergence in the stan-
dard of living are likely to be frustrated 
in the longer term. In this sense, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
are torn between national and regional-
level economic strategies and interests. 
Moreover, the requirements of EU mem-
bership ultimately forces these countries to 
think more regionally or locally than was 
previously the case – in particular with 
respect to the use and administration of 
the EU’s structural and cohesion funds.  
These countries now face the require-
ment of consolidating the past decade of 
privatization, economic restructuring and 
foreign investment into more firmly em-
bedded systems of economic production 
and technological development. Essentially 
these countries would like to improve na-
tional networks for innovation promotion – 
to counter the encroachment of exogenous 
economic development with the creation of 
more endogenous economic networks. At 
the same time, powerful forces are at 
work in the European Union to limit the 
degree of economic competition between 
East and West, potentially reducing the 
inflow of resources and restricting the na-
ture and shape of the economic develop-
ment tools these countries have at their 
disposal. EU membership, for example, 
meant the disbanding or reduction of 
many investment promotion strategies pre-
                                                 
17 Not all of the evidence is so negative and there 
are a few significant examples of firms importing 
important shares of their R&D activity. See e.g. 
Berend (2000) on the example of General Electric 
in Hungary. For a broader overview of this gen-
eral problem, see Ellison (forthcoming). 
viously used by national governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Ellison, forth-
coming). 
Widening regional disparities in income 
and employment increasingly weigh on na-
tional level politics and encourage regional 
actors to become more and more politi-
cally active, in particular with respect to 
the national and regional level decision-
making framework. Moreover, the EU’s 
imposition of decentralization in the for-
mulation and administration of regional 
policy goals and funding (in particular 
where regional policy is governed by 
structural fund projects), reinforces the 
political strength of regional actors. 
Central governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe have so far been resistant 
to the decentralization of regional policy. 
There are of course multiple factors that 
might explain this. For one, CEE central 
governments enjoyed highly centralized po-
litical power throughout the Communist 
era and may not be willing to relinquish 
such power easily. For another, decentrali-
zation has for the most part been imposed 
from above and thus does not always 
map well onto local and national-level in-
terest formations (Dimitrova, 2002). This 
fact alone raises important questions about 
the degree to which the created regions 
are what one might call “organic” struc-
tures of interest representation. Dieringer 
and Lindstrom (2002) argue that the de-
gree of compatibility between EU and na-
tional policies is above all a function of 
the degree of fit or misfit between existing 
and adopted EU regional institutional 
structure. More “organic” definitions of 
regions that preserve the character of lo-
cally embedded knowledge-creation and 
interest networks may be more likely to 
promote the economic development and 
long-term competitiveness of regions.18 To 
                                                 
18 McDermott (2004) makes the argument that 
Polish regions represent embedded regional interest 
networks and thus exhibit a high degree of “fit” 
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the extent that regions and regional gov-
ernments – in particular those in decline – 
are not well-suited to the development of 
locally embedded knowledge-creation, ef-
forts at decentralization and regionaliza-
tion are likely to be resisted.19 
The most compelling reason however 
for resistance to decentralization is simply 
that highly centralized policy making facili-
tates the formulation and implementation 
of cohesive national economic policy goals, 
while the strengthening of regional bodies 
may have the impact of fragmenting and 
dissipating their focus. The vertical rigidity 
introduced by Hungary’s integration into 
more EU-based market networks propels 
national level policy initiatives intended to 
promote the creation of internal innovation 
promotion networks. This is presumably 
easiest to do by promoting the strengthen-
ing of ties between domestic and foreign 
firms and investors in the more developed 
regions and by attempting to strengthen 
R&D capacity in Hungary. 
Thus, the interests of actors in the 
more developed regions of Hungary are 
more likely to fit easily with current inter-
ests in counter-acting the rise of the ex-
ogenous economy. Both foreign affiliates 
                                                                             
in the language of Dieringer and Lindblom. In 
Hungary, NUTS II regions were superimposed on 
the existing structure and network of counties with 
approximately 3 counties for every region (except 
for Central Hungary, which represents Budapest 
and the surrounding area). The resulting regions 
often exhibit little attention to more organic, locally 
based structures of interest and identity.  
19 In Hungary, for example, local governments 
around the Balaton area have resisted their division 
and incorporation into 3 separate regions. As the 
Balaton region has long survived on the foundation 
of tourism, some have mobilized for the creation 
of an independent Balaton region. The division and 
incorporation of the Balaton region into 3 separate 
regions comprising the rapid development of manu-
facturing has meant that regional efforts confront 
competing demands. In such cases, the presence of 
significant resources (i.e. EU structural and cohe-
sion funds) may drive strong demands for more 
local and newly defined regional decision-making 
autonomy (see Oláh, 2005). 
and domestic firms in regions with larger 
FDI shares are likely to lobby for the ex-
tension or continuation of national level 
economic policy goals. Thus, in the long 
run these actors are likely to be the allies 
of central governments since they are 
likely to favour the continuation of the 
status quo – in particular to the extent 
that such policies emphasize investment 
promotion and other attempts to build 
linkages between foreign and domestic in-
dustry (at least to the extent that these 
policies do not run counter to the EU 
competition policy).20  
In the less developed regions of Hun-
gary, on the other hand, regional devel-
opment and investment needs are at least 
potentially very different. While this point 
is clearly recognized by some analysts (see 
e.g. Pál, 2005), its implementation and re-
alization remains problematic. Thus both 
domestic firms and regional government 
entities in lagging regions are likely to 
lobby strongly for more pronounced re-
gional policy efforts and ultimately for 
greater levels of political decentralization. 
Foreign affiliates – in particular because 
they are less dependent on local sources 
for capital and investment support – may 
potentially go either way. They may re-
main indifferent to regional policy goals, 
or they may favour national level policy 
goals (e.g. Lisbon-type strategies), or more 
regional policy goals depending on their 
immediate production and infrastructure 
needs. 
                                                 
20 Prior to EU membership, this was in fact the 
case. EU accession has witnessed the increasing 
grip of EU–level competition policies and thus the 
elimination of some national-level investment promo-
tion strategies in Central and Eastern Europe (Elli-








In Hungary, centralized, national-level po-
litical development has a long history, 
equaled and eclipsed only by the long his-
torical development of county governments 
(vármegye). A third level of governance 
was initiated at the beginning of the de-
mocratic transition with the 1990 law on 
local government and a fourth possible 
level of governance was introduced with 
the 1996 and 1999 laws on regions intro-
duced in compliance with European Union 
(EU) demands for the establishment of 
NUTS II level administrative units. In im-
portant respects, Hungary’s growing tug 
of war between its insistent centralization 
and regional, county and local demands 
for economic development and greater po-
litical decentralization have only just be-
gun. But given both the rapidly increasing 
regional differences in the level of eco-
nomic development, regional disparities 
and the uneven flow of foreign investment 
from the European Union, regional politics 
will become more and more heavily politi-
cized in the years to come. 
In the early 1990’s, there was stronger 
government support for political decen-
tralization in Hungary. The 1990 Act on 
Local Self-Government greatly strengthened 
the lowest level of governance by allowing 
local councils to voluntarily form some 
3200 local governments with direct elec-
tions. At the same time, this Act greatly 
weakened the previous dominance of Hun-
garian counties by assigning the right to 
levy taxes and all basic competencies to 
the local governments (Vigvári, 2005:  
230; Pálné Kovács, 2005: 206). Thus, local 
governments were granted far greater po-
litical power and autonomy than they had 
enjoyed under the previous Communist re-
gime. Most argue this was a response to 
the overly centralized power of the state 
under Communism and thus an example 
of democratization (Fowler, 2001).  
In contrast however, Hungary began to 
recentralize political power with the intro-
duction of NUTS II regional administrative 
units. NUTS II regions were created in 
Hungary as administrative units for the 
management of pre-accession and struc-
tural and cohesion funds, largely at the 
behest of the European Union – pointing 
to the importance of the EU. However, 
several authors have suggested that the 
creation of NUTS II administrative regions 
in Hungary was taken as an opportunity 
to reassert the powers of the central gov-
ernment and thus the state over the for-
mulation of regional policy and EU fund-
ing. Moreover, both of the major political 
parties in Hungary appear to have been 
equally interested in maintaining greater 
centralized control (Fowler, 2001). 
Hungary began to introduce NUTS II 
regional administrative units with the 1996 
law on the regions. One of the strongest 
indicators of the lack of central govern-
ment will to introduce strong regional 
governments was the fact that NUTS II 
regions in Hungary were initially volun-
tary. Counties wishing to band together to 
form regional administrative units were 
encouraged to do so, but there was no 
legally binding requirement for this to 
happen. Consequently, the regions estab-
lished after 1996 were loosely organized 
administrative structures and were not 
formed either consistently or uniformly 
across Hungary.  
With the 1999 law on the regions, 
Hungary introduced legally defined admin-
istrative regions and guaranteed funding 
for them. However, even these regions and 
the respective “regional development coun-
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cils” (RDC’s) have remained more strongly 
controlled by the central government and 
the respective ministerial bodies (Pogátsa, 
2005a; Fowler, 2001). Half the RDC votes 
are distributed among local governments 
and micro-regions, counties and city-
counties and the other half are distributed 
among government officials representing 
the various ministries. The more numerous 
local governments and micro-regions in 
particular remain heavily under-
represented due to their very small seat 
shares (Pogátsa, 2005a: 21-2). The conse-
quence is that unless regional entities can 
coordinate voting, they are easily out-
weighed by central government representa-
tives. 
Since, as noted above, the municipal 
level currently enjoys a far greater degree 
of democratic accountability and legiti-
macy, the voting structure in the RDC’s 
results in a potential mismatch between 
democratically legitimated authority and 
authority at the county and regional level. 
Pálné Kovacs further argues that power 
within the RDC’s is frequently dominated 
by individuals able to cumulate mandates 
across county public office (in particular 
county general assembly chairs automati-
cally become chairs of the County Devel-
opment Councils), county and regional de-
velopment councils, and higher offices (e.g. 
the National Development Council and/or 
National Parliament) (2005: 14-15).  
The socialist MSZP government elected 
in 2002 introduced a plan in late 2002 
that foresaw directly elected regional gov-
ernments and an increase in their share of 
own resources21 – presumably with the 
intention of increasing the degree of de-
mocratic legitimation of regional policy. 
However, the MSZP government failed to 
introduce its proposals into law and 
quickly dropped discussions of them. Part 
                                                 
21 See for example the Hungarian Ministry of the 
Interior’s “Public Administration Reform Plans in 
Hungary (2003-2006)” (2003: 4). 
of the problem faced by the socialist (and 
other Hungarian) government(s) is the re-
quirement of a 2/3rds majority for consti-
tutional amendments (Pálné Kovacs, 2005: 
9).22 Moreover, this requirement is likely 
to present more and more difficulties in 
the future, as Hungary gradually becomes 
more of a 2-party system – potentially 
rendering it impossible for Hungary to 
make further constitutional changes. Given 
Hungary’s current two party dominant 
composition (both the SZDSZ and the MDF 
are quite small), it is more than difficult 
for either the MSZP or FIDESZ to call 
upon a sufficient share of votes to be able 
to pass such changes on their own.23 Fur-
ther, given the degree of ideological dis-
tance and conflict between the two major 
parties, it is difficult for them to pass 
such constitutional amendments in concert 
with each other. 
The National Regional Development 
Concept (NRDC) published in June 2005 
called for regional reform. However, re-
gional elections are put off until approxi-
mately 2014, a time-framework that would 
preserve centralized control even over the 
general outlines of the EU’s 2014–2020 
Financial Framework Perspective. Moreover, 
further discussion on appropriate models 
for the creation of self-governing regions 
was put off until 2008–2010. At the same 
time however, the NRDC provided the 
foundational framework for the develop-
ment of regional operative programs 
(ROP’s) for the second National Develop-
ment Program covering the period 2007–
2013. This represents a significant change 
                                                 
22 The 1999 reform was made easier for the 
FIDESZ government to pass by classifying it as 
focusing on “regional development” and not “pub-
lic administrative” reform, thus requiring only a 
simple parliamentary majority (Fowler, 2001: 26). 
23 Since 1989, only one Hungarian government 
enjoyed a strong enough majority to be able to 
successfully pass constitutional legislation: the 1994-
1998 MSZP-SZDSZ government. This fact represents 
a significant and under-researched dilemma in the 
current Hungarian constitutional framework. 
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from the more centralized strategy pur-
sued over the 2004–2006 period. During 
this period, the first National Development 
Plan (NDP) only provided for one centrally 
managed ROP for all seven Hungarian 
regions at once (Lakatos and Túry, 2005). 
All-in-all, only very limited attention was 
granted to regions in the first NDP.  
While the election of a FIDESZ govern-
ment in 2006 might possibly have modi-
fied some of these plans, big changes in 
policy were not likely.24 For one, if previ-
ous experience is any guide, the central 
government (whoever is in power) is likely 
to hold onto central decision-making au-
thority for as long as possible. To date, 
both of the major parties have tended to 
favour more centralized control over deci-
sions related to regional development and 
have failed to make significant institutional 
reforms to further strengthen regional de-
cision-making autonomy. While frequent 
promises are made with respect to further 
decentralization, in general there has been 
only very limited progress. 
The replacement of the head of the Na-
tional Development Agency (NDA) with the 
2nd Gyurcsany Ferenc government in July 
2006 ultimately witnessed a further sig-
nificant centralization of national govern-
ment control over EU SCF’s. Rather than 
continue to disperse monies through dif-
ferent programs and ministries, Bajnai 
Gordon announced the intention to “cen-
tralize spending (and thus decision-making) 
in the hands of a single office”, except 
where such funds are to be distributed 
through regional authorities. Where previ-
ously several teams from different minis-
tries were involved in the management of 
EU funds, the funds were then “merged 
                                                 
24 During the 2006 electoral campaign, Fidesz 
criticisms of the MSZP’s national development pro-
gram amounted to little more than objections that 
the party’s platform drew too heavily on the MSZP 
government’s plan. Fidesz proposed few concrete 
alternatives. 
into one single organization”.25 Moreover, 
despite increased emphasis on regional op-
erative programs, the NDA announced – 
as outlined in the New Hungary National 
Development Plan, 2007–2013 – it will 
spend some 75-80 per cent of its 2007–
2013 Framework Perspective funding on 
sectoral programs, while 20-25 per cent 
will be used for human capital develop-
ment.  
The growing centralization of political 
control has resulted in strong criticisms 
from the major opposition party, in par-
ticular due to the lack of parliamentary 
control over NDA decisions. While the 
broad parameters of the most recent New 
Hungary National Development Plan have 
been approved by the national govern-
ment, on October 25th, 2006, parliamen-
tary control over the broad framework of 
the program is lacking. Despite discussion 
of the possibility of elevating the office to 
the level of a ministerial position – requir-
ing parliamentary approval of NDA deci-
sions – this step was not taken until July 
1st, 2007, well after the major decisions 
concerning the distribution of EU funding 
had already been made.26 
Trends from the European Commission 
tend to reinforce greater centralization at 
the level of the state. The previous struc-
ture of the EU’s SCF provided an impetus 
for stronger regional involvement in deci-
sion-making. The reverse was true, how-
ever, for the 2004–2006 Framework Per-
spective and is likely to remain true for 
the 2007–2013 Framework Perspective. For 
one, the 2007–2013 Framework Perspective 
                                                 
25 Budapest Business Journal: “Bajnai takes over 
development office ahead of revamp” (July 16th, 
2006). 
26 The modified version of Government Decree 
130/2006 went into effect on July 1st, 2007. In this 
modified version, the NDA is responsible to the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Devel-
opment. Prior to this modification, the NDA was 
responsible only to the Prime Minister’s Office (see 
Complex Jogtar, 2007). 
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approved by the European Council in De-
cember 2005 represents a significant shift 
toward the cohesion model. The result is a 
significant shift toward the state level and 
away from regional involvement in deci-
sion-making (Pogátsa, 2005b: 267).  
Features of SCF planning proscribed by 
the European Commission likewise rein-
force the decision-making capacity of the 
state. For one, EU co-financing require-
ments ultimately favour national level insti-
tutions, since approval of such funds de-
pends on national or ministry-level support 
for individual projects.27 Moreover, the 
regions in Hungary are resource-poor and 
thus not able to finance programs on 
their own. Finally, a recent DGRegio com-
missioned study – assigned the task of 
identifying linkages between the Lisbon 
Agenda and regional policy goals – came 
to the conclusion that regional policy 
should be more firmly integrated into na-
tional-level policy goals.28 Finally, the 
growing emphasis on the Lisbon Agenda 
and more horizontal measures further 
strengthens the hands of the central gov-
ernment.  
Thus the role played by the European 
Union has been ambiguous. Though some 
view the European Union – in particular 
the European Commission – as one of the 
main proponents of decentralization and 
the rise of regionalism, the Commission’s 
role has been more ambiguous in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The Commission has 
seemingly encouraged greater decentraliza-
tion of regional administration while at the 
same time requiring – at least for the 
                                                 
27 Co-financing tools – for example the EU’s 50 
per cent co-financing requirement for structural 
funds is seen as a mechanism for forcing corre-
spondence between regional and national level in-
terests in economic development (Bachtler et al., 
2003: 16).  
28 See in particular the conclusion of the report 
completed for the EU’s Regional Policy Directorate 
General by the Danish Technological Institute 
(2005). 
early years of structural and cohesion 
fund administration – that the central 
governments maintain strong control over 
the formulation of Regional Operative Pro-
grams (ROP’s), and the administration and 
use of EU funds for the 2004–2006 pe-
riod. Thus, while the EU required the in-
troduction of NUTS II regional administra-
tive units for the purposes of distributing 
EU resources, it failed to require that re-
gions be granted decision-making auton-
omy.29 
This does not mean that the effect of 
the EU has been entirely negative on the 
formation and strengthening of regional 
entities. The distribution of both pre-
accession and structural funding has en-
couraged greater organizational efforts at 
the local, city and county levels for some 
time (Lakatos and Túry, 2005). But in 
most respects, the real consequence of 
creating NUTS II regions and RDC’s in 
Hungary has been a tremendous strength-
ening of the powers of the central gov-
ernment over local, city and county level 
interests. The degree of centralized power 
extends from the control of votes in the 
RDC’s all the way down to the funding of 
applications for EU structural fund pro-
jects, which some argue predetermines the 
content of final projects.30 
Few seem to disagree that further re-
form of the Hungarian regional develop-
ment model and its institutional underpin-
                                                 
29 See for example Keating (2003), Hughes, Sasse 
and Gordon (2003). On the Hungarian case, see 
Pogátsa (2005a). Considerable disagreement is evi-
dent in the literature over who was responsible for 
centralized government control of EU funding dur-
ing the 2004–2006 period. While Keating (2003) 
argues that the European Commission promoted 
centralization, my own interviews suggest that – at 
least in the Hungarian case – the impetus arose 
from Hungarian government insistence on retaining 
centralized control during the first National Devel-
opment Plan. This view is further supported by 
Inotai and Szemlér (2005). 




nings is clearly needed. Most appear to 
agree that the regional institutional struc-
ture needs to be strengthened. Further, 
most seem to agree that there are too 
many local governments and that some 
more efficient (and moderately more cen-
tralized) system of local governance needs 
to be established. Beyond that, there ap-
pears to be little consensus on what form 
a new version of regional government 
should take. The establishment of regional 
governments based on the current NUTS II 
level of organization would presumably go 
a long way to legitimizing regional devel-
opment policies and goals. Moreover, due 
to the legitimation factor, democratically 
elected regional governments would pre-
sumably make it politically difficult for the 
central government to dominate decisions 
over regional policy and the use of EU 
structural funds. However, given the lack 
of “organic”, embedded interest structures 
paralleling the NUTS II level in Hungary, 
there is necessarily considerable competi-
tion and concern over the eventual out-
come of regional reform. 
4) THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL, 
COUNTY, REGIONAL AND 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Support for globalization, EU membership 
and European economic integration is pre-
sumably hardest to win in the less devel-
oped regions of Hungary (and other 
CEEC’s). Rapidly rising consumer, land and 
housing prices meet here with rapidly de-
clining levels of employment, falling GDP 
per capita and dramatically low FDI. Thus 
nowhere are the differences between win-
ners and losers in the Central and East 
European transition more evident than in 
their cross-regional variation. The pro-
nounced geographic and regional distribu-
tion of the benefits and disadvantages of 
integrating markets suggest that while 
there may be aggregate welfare benefits to 
globalization and European economic inte-
gration, these are not evenly distributed. 
Empirical evidence suggests the real losers 
of globalization and European integration 
are low-skilled workers with little educa-
tion, especially those in declining regions. 
Not only do individuals in these regions 
exhibit the lowest and declining labour 
force participation rates, per capita GDP 
adjusted for the cost of living (PPP’s) has 
likewise declined in the less developed re-
gions of Hungary (Pál, 2005; Szemlér, 
2004; Ehrlich and Szigetvári, 2003; Déak 
and Lengyel, 2003).  
Variation in regional rates of economic 
growth and development is of course not 
news in the wider European Union. De-
spite evidence of increasing economic con-
vergence across states, increasing regional 
disparities are a global phenomenon (Sala-
I-Martin, 2002) and are likewise well rec-
ognized in the European context (Quah, 
1996). Their appearance however in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE) represents 
one of the greatest challenges to the crea-
tion of a successful Union. This is above 
all the case because the less developed re-
gions of CEE have experienced some of 
the worst features of the economic transi-
tion. The fall in both regional real wages 
and per capita GDP – together with dra-
matic increases in the CEE price index and 
declining regional activity rates – place 
significant burdens on the welfare and 
future outlook of the less developed re-
gions.  
Despite their increasing relevance as 
socio-economic units of construction, re-
gions may only have a high propensity to 
become strong political actors within the 
European framework under certain cir-
cumstances. National level expenditure on 
regional development tends to be more 
significant than EU level structural and 
cohesion fund spending. By way of exam-
ple, approximately 24 per cent of gov-
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ernment expenditure in Hungary is dele-
gated to the local governments (Vigvári, 
2005: 231). While EU spending in Central 
and Eastern Europe will not be negligible, 
it has generally been capped at no more 
than 4 per cent of the GDP of any indi-
vidual country.31 Further, EU structural 
and cohesion fund spending imposes a co-
financing requirement generally paid by 
central governments and thus – as noted 
above – likely to favour national over lo-
cal governments. Although there is some 
expectation that local governments will 
participate financially in structural fund 
projects, local governments in Hungary 
and other Central and East European 
countries are typically resource-poor and 
thus highly dependent upon national gov-
ernments. Finally, as noted above, the 
gradual shift toward cohesion and away 
from structural funding further will fur-
ther emphasize and strengthen the role of 
national governments over local govern-
ments. 
At the EU level, regional actors do not 
as yet play a significant role in the politi-
cal decision-making process. Despite the 
relative degree of support such actors 
may receive from the Commission, they 
are not able to outweigh the political 
power of states or individual EP represen-
tatives and do not have explicit voting 
power (in contrast to both state level rep-
resentatives in the Council of Ministers 
and country level representatives in the 
EP). Moreover, on the key distributional 
questions decided by the EU (the CAP and 
SCF), voting continues to be made by 
unanimity. Thus the power of individual 
states to block agreements remains greater 
than the power of any other single actor 
in the political decision-making process. 
                                                 
31 Part of the 1999 Berlin Agreement, the 4 per 
cent of GDP cap has not been modified, despite 
objections it imposes an artificial ceiling with little 
relevance to the actual “absorption capacities” of 
states. 
The only caveat here is that the EP ap-
pears increasingly willing to exercise its 
budgetary powers over the multi-annual 
framework perspectives, in particular the 
current 2007–2013 Framework Perspective. 
However, even here, one might expect in-
dividual MEP’s to vote state interests on 
such high profile distributional issues.  
At the national level, the potential mis-
match between national interests in eco-
nomic growth and regional interests in 
reversing within border increases in eco-
nomic inequality is ultimately likely to lead 
to competing interests at the level of local 
and national level policy-making processes. 
Assuming regional variation in economic 
performance across all states – this may 
be an erroneous assumption, since smaller 
states are potentially less likely to be con-
fronted with the demands of regional 
variation in economic development32 – one 
can expect there to be at least two kinds 
of regional groupings that might form 
some kind of collective action group. 
Which collective action formation is likely 
to be stronger at the national and/or re-
gional level, and which of these two pos-
sible groupings is likely to promote spe-
cifically regional over national interests is 
more complicated. For one, both types of 
regional grouping are potentially equally 
interested in state support, the one be-
cause it will potentially bring higher prof-
its and an increase in the standard of liv-
ing, the other because it is likely to bring 
relief from economic decline and citizen 
discontent. 
Evidence that spatial and regional con-
siderations structure interests is provided 
                                                 
32 Streeck (1999) argues that smaller states will 
have an easier time dealing with the problems of 
regional variation in economic performance and 
demands for stronger regional governance since 
small states are more likely to synonymous with 
regional economic structure. Hungary however, 
with a population of approximately 10 million, 




by suggestions that when questions of ter-
ritorial significance arise, partisan differ-
ences fade at both the national and re-
gional levels in favour of the representa-
tion of either national or local government 
interests. As discussed above, Fowler 
(2001) demonstrates that the two major 
parties favour strong centralization of po-
litical power in the management of the 
regions. On the other end, political parties 
– in particular in the less developed re-
gions – others have observed a willingness 
to forget party labels and lobby govern-
ments independently of the party label. 
Kulcsár and Domokos (2005), for exam-
ple, observe that actors engage in cross-
party territorially-based coalitions of inter-
est. Such a partisan behaviour is facilitated 
and reinforced by the application for and 
potential receipt of EU and other types of 
funding.  
Nonetheless, the regional vs. central di-
mension is clearly open for political ex-
ploitation and polarization along regional-
central lines. This in fact happened follow-
ing the May 2006 re-election of the MSZP 
government. In September 2006, revela-
tions that the MSZP knowingly shielded a 
rapidly growing budget deficit from the 
public eye in order to win the May elec-
tions led to widespread public discontent 
and national protests. Elections to local 
and county governments in October 2006 
resulted in landslide wins for Fidesz led 
regional governments in all counties except 
for one. Budapest SZDSZ mayor (Demszky 
Gábor) also managed to remain in office 
by a wide margin.  
Thus the county level elections are likely 
to further contribute to the polarization of 
the regional-central political debate in 
Hungary. The major part of this regional-
central debate is currently focused on the 
Hungarian government’s New Balance aus-
terity policy and reforms of the educa-
tional and health sectors. However, ele-
ments of these reforms likewise generate 
strong conflicts across the regional-central 
dimension – in particular where they in-
volve decisions on the survival of regional 
healthcare facilities and schools. And there 
are strong indications that the regional-
centre political debates – in particular in 
the context of its party polarization – are 
likely to affect the ability of the central 
government to promote strong regional 
development goals and policies.33 
Perhaps the most interesting question to 
emerge out of the current political forma-
tion is whether the politically polarized 
regional-central configuration will persist 
on into the future. The gradual conver-
gence in Hungary toward a two-party sys-
tem along with the potential staggering of 
national and local government elections 
suggests that such polarization could 
characterize future governments. 
Divergent interests dominate the political 
centralization/decentralization debate. “De-
centralizers” favour handing over greater 
decision-making autonomy to regional and 
lower level administrative bodies. The basic 
defense of this position is frequently based 
on arguments supporting decentralization 
as a means of achieving higher levels de-
mocratization.34 Further, some argue that 
state-control is likely to reinforce a more 
“sectoral” approach to regional develop-
ment – influenced in particular by state 
ministries and/or the new National Devel-
opment Agency. Finally, some argue that 
                                                 
33 According to news reports, Orbáan Viktor in-
structed fellow party members not to negotiate 
with the central government. This may have dis-
rupted not only government attempts to reform the 
educational and healthcare sectors, but more im-
portantly for this paper, could hamper regional 
development initiatives – in particular Regional Op-
erative Programs – funded by the EU’s SCF’s and 
requiring co-financing from the central government. 
See e.g. www.168ora.hu: “Something is Happening” 
(Feb. 2nd, 2007). 
34 On the case of Central and East European coun-
tries, including Hungary, see Bruszt (2005). On 
Poland, see McDermott (2004). This approach 
however extends to discussions of economic devel-
opment in Western Europe. See for example Put-
nam et al. (1993). 
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regional sub-units exhibit little economic 
uniformity and thus require greater atten-
tion to regional specificity and local 
knowledge resources. Though decidedly 
difficult to characterize supporters of de-
centralization, interests in decentralization 
appear to have a strong regional flavour. 
Supporters of decentralization are fre-
quently from the regions themselves, while 
those closer to the centre are frequently 
supporters of more centralized control. 
Those favouring stronger centralized 
control argue that decentralization threat-
ens to fragment or de-concentrate the po-
tential impact of regional economic devel-
opment spending. In this literature, the 
consequences of decentralization are two-
fold:  1) regional administrative units are 
ill-equipped – due to insufficient financial 
resources and weak organizational skills – 
to handle the co-financing and administra-
tive requirements of EU regional develop-
ment funding; and 2) the potential impact 
of regional development spending is likely 
to be weakened or defeated by the failure 
to maintain integration and cohesiveness 
with larger projects organized and ap-
proved by central governments.  
5) CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS 
Central governments have a natural desire 
to preserve their decision-making auton-
omy and presumably favour decision-
making processes that are less distorted by 
local level concerns. Moreover, some de-
gree of decision-making autonomy may be 
a good thing – in particular where this 
protects governments from capture. Finally, 
democracy is likely to provide a more 
equal distribution of public resources than 
authoritarian government and central gov-
ernment policies that depend on democ-
ratic institutions are more likely to be 
broadly responsive to the interests of the 
electorate.35 In this regard, where there is 
already some degree of centralized politi-
cal control over economic policy, one 
might expect to find a status quo bias in 
favour of centralized political control. This 
is above all likely to be true due to the 
government’s gatekeeper role with respect 
to the chosen level of centralization and 
decentralization. 
Moreover, central governments in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (and in other less 
advanced states) face somewhat unique 
circumstances in that they are strongly 
pressured to find ways to promote greater 
economic convergence with the more ad-
vanced regions of Europe. What the role 
of the state should be in this regard is 
far more controversial. At least part of 
this discussion needs to engage notions of 
the New Economy and their appropriate-
ness for understanding economic processes. 
Neo-liberal models assume the state should 
be much less involved in the management 
of economic processes. New Economy 
models, on the other hand, tend to arrive 
at quite different assumptions about the 
possible role of the state.  
The pressure of pursuing economic 
convergence and the presumed require-
ment of government involvement in that 
process may lead the central government 
to be more sceptical about the decentrali-
zation of economic decision-making. Simply 
devolving decision-making and resources to 
lower levels of the decision-making process 
could lead to the fragmentation of eco-
nomic strategies or the misallocation of 
resources and thus to a diminution of the 
central government’s ability to pursue ag-
                                                 
35 Hellman (1998) argues the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe exhibiting greater degrees of 
democracy were compelled to distribute resources 
more evenly across the populations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Failed democracy made it possible 
to distribute benefits to government cronies. More 
generally, Lake and Baum (2001) argue democratic 
political systems distribute benefits more evenly 
than authoritarian ones. 
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gregate growth and convergence. More-
over, significant differences in the level of 
economic expertise or the skills and man-
power of regional and local development 
agencies are likely to lead to a strong 
status quo bias toward centralized control. 
Finally, uneven political power (e.g. local 
dominance of opposition parties) or inade-
quate reform of local political party struc-
tures may likewise lead to hesitation to-
ward the decentralization of political deci-
sion-making. 
In many ways, this fits the Hungarian 
case well. For one, the central government 
has contributed significant resources to-
ward the restructuring and rebuilding of 
the Hungarian economy (Ellison, forthcom-
ing). Many of these policies – in particu-
lar privatization and investment promotion 
strategies – have produced a remarkable 
degree of success. The Hungarian economy 
is now heavily privatized and foreign firms 
in particular contribute to a significant 
share of economic activity and the export 
market (see e.g. Hunya, 2004). Moreover, 
it is clear that government policy has for 
the most part tended to favour national 
level strategies and has been much less 
strongly focused on regional concerns – in 
particular in the early years of the transi-
tion process. 
This does not mean however, that gov-
ernment policy has completely neglected 
the less developed regions of Hungary. 
Early on, investment promotion strategies 
in Hungary attempted to favour regions 
by lowering the minimum requirements for 
such regions and occasionally granting 
more significant tax advantages (see Elli-
son, forthcoming). Keune et al. (2004) 
likewise point out that regional actors 
have been equally successful in attracting 
state resources. Both types of policies how-
ever have seen remarkably little success. 
While government expenditure has been 
devoted to less developed regions, as 
noted above, this has not been accompa-
nied by a similar degree of economic suc-
cess. The eastern regions remain under-
developed, exhibit far higher levels of un-
employment and have received very little 
to none of the large share of foreign di-
rect investment flowing into Hungary. 
Whether this fact is directly attributable to 
the mismanagement of funds at the local 
level or to simple disadvantages of eco-
nomic geography is less clear.  
In the long run, however, the relative 
success of national level government poli-
cies in the western regions and Budapest 
in particular is likely generate some resis-
tance to the complete decentralization of 
regional development strategies. In the eyes 
of some, decentralization will lead to fur-
ther deterioration in the quality of national 
and regional economic development policy 
goals. Moreover, in Hungary, national 
level economic strategies have begun to 
take on a new flavour, more oriented in 
particular toward the promotion of R&D 
potential and building stronger links be-
tween foreign and domestic firms. Finally, 
there is the insufficiently theorized but 
ever-present threat that misallocated funds 
are wasted funds. Misallocated funds 
draw resources away from regionally can-
tered growth engines that may ultimately 
have positive feedbacks on less advanced 
regions as well. 
6) LOCAL, CITY, COUNTY 
AND/OR REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
Regional entities in Hungary are tremen-
dously fragmented and do not typically 
work well together. Even the various asso-
ciations of village, local, city, large city 
and county government tend not to coop-
erate with each on attempting to improve 
the nature and quality of regional govern-
ance. The voluntary establishment of over 
3000 local governments in Hungary has 
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led to an inefficient public administration 
structure frequently unable to handle the 
multiple tasks of government. Thus even 
the small local government associations 
argue that local governments cannot con-
tinue to administrate all the features of 
government currently in their purview 
(healthcare, education, sanitation, infra-
structure, local roads) and that some of 
these tasks need to be organized at more 
moderately more centralized levels. Fur-
ther, NUTS II regions have no historical 
antecedents in Hungary, thus creating con-
siderable mismatch between the regional 
level and the more “organic” institutional 
and organizational structures present at 
the county and local levels. 
In many respects, the interest structures 
in Hungary are still relatively undefined.36 
While the availability of EU funds and the 
requirement of submitting well-defined and 
tailored project proposals provide incen-
tives for the creation of stronger regional 
entities, several features likewise makes 
them relatively weak bodies. For one, as 
many authors point out, Hungary has a 
far larger number of local governments 
than most other old member states, sug-
gesting that the level of governance is too 
strongly dispersed and unmanageable. For 
another, governments at the regional and 
local level lack sufficient funding with 
which to pursue more independent agen-
das. Most local, city and even many 
county governments are thus dependent 
upon the central government for financial 
assistance. Finally, local, city and county 
governments lack sufficient skilled staff 
with which to engage in the development 
and formulation of large independent 
plans for regional development. It is per-
haps no surprise that the most successful 
regional plans have been put together in 
the more advanced regions of Hungary. 
                                                 
36 See e.g. the article “Területféjlesztés” published 
by Rechnitzer in Nepszava (July 31, 2006). 
The interests of local and regional gov-
ernments (or agencies) are likely to di-
verge depending on how individual regions 
have fared during the economic transition. 
As the New Economy literature would 
generally predict, economic development in 
Hungary has been quite uneven and re-
gions that have traditionally lagged behind 
national levels of economic development 
have continued to do so throughout the 
process of economic transition. On the one 
hand, regions that have fared well are 
likely to be more favourably disposed to-
ward the continued role of the central 
government in economic policy-making. 
While the failure of some firms – in par-
ticular many domestically owned small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME’s) – to gain 
greater linkages into European production 
networks may not make them favourably 
disposed toward European integration, the 
principal political resource for such dual 
economy firms is above all the central 
government.  
Whether greater local autonomy would 
necessarily strengthen the political bargain-
ing power of SME’s in the more advanced 
regions is questionable. For one, they are 
in a minority at the local level and com-
pete against much larger multinational 
firms (MNC’s) for local and state re-
sources. Local elites – to the extent that 
they wish to keep larger MNC’s with size-
able employment effects in the region – 
are inclined to pay more attention to their 
interests than those of a much smaller 
subset of SME’s employing far smaller 
shares of the local population and making 
smaller contributions to local public reve-
nues. 
At the national level, SME’s comprise a 
more sizeable political force and the na-
tional government likewise tends to view 
the degree of “local embeddedness” of 
MNC’s as a potential counterforce to the 
otherwise “footloose” nature of many firms 
in the global economy. Thus, through in-
creasing the share of interactions and ex-
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changes between the larger MNC’s and 
the SME network in individual regions – 
or by otherwise building supplier-
manufacturer networks between foreign 
and domestic firms – it is hoped to secure 
longer term economic, social and political 
stability in these regions. For the most 
part, national and local government 
strategies are thus focused on promoting 
local R&D networks and strongly favour 
investments in local skill and content. 
While less advantaged dual economy firms 
are likely to favour a stronger focus on 
the local content of investment promotion 
strategies, they are not necessarily likely to 
favour strong decentralization. 
Whether regions that have not fared 
well are likely to be favourably disposed 
to maintaining a strong role for the cen-
tral government in regional policy, or 
whether they would prefer more regional 
autonomy is problematic. On the one 
hand, the less developed regions tend to 
feel left out of the economic catch-up 
game. Eastern Hungary, for example, has 
received very little FDI and even the rate 
of infrastructure development (e.g. rail 
and highways) and other government in-
vestments have been slower. While there 
has always been a regional component to 
the national industrial policy framework 
(e.g. the investment ceiling required for 
receiving 10-year tax holidays for large 
investments was far lower in the less de-
veloped regions), foreign investment strate-
gies have tended to follow predictable 
paths, with the predominant share landing 
in historically more developed regions of 
Hungary: Budapest and the Western re-
gions of Hungary.  
On the other hand, due in part to the 
absence of large shares of foreign inves-
tors, local governments in the East of 
Hungary likewise have few independent 
revenue tracks upon which they can de-
pend. While they do receive a share of 
national government revenues, this share 
has been on the decline. This typically 
means that local governments are highly 
dependent upon national governments for 
the funding of local and regional devel-
opment goals. While this deficit ultimately 
represents a golden opportunity for the EU 
to strengthen regional demands for auton-
omy, essentially the opposite has happened. 
The EU has by and large favoured greater 
levels of centralization or has failed to in-
sist on adequate decentralization. It is tell-
ing that most of the different regional as-
sociations in Hungary see the problem of 
decentralization and greater regional deci-
sion-making autonomy as one that Hun-
gary has to solve on its own. 
Further, the compatibility of EU-type 
funding – in particular its suitability for 
coping with the problems of regional de-
velopment in the less advanced regions – 
is a matter of contention (Ellison, forth-
coming). One of the more successful tools 
for Hungary has been the use of invest-
ment promotion strategies. While the less 
developed regions have not benefited from 
this as much as the more advanced re-
gions, it is still one of the more potentially 
beneficial strategies for these less devel-
oped regions. EU state aid policy however 
extends relatively strong limitations to the 
use of this type of policy. On the other 
hand, many of the newer Lisbon-type 
strategies promoted by the EU are more 
clearly suited to the needs of the more 
advanced regions in Hungary. 
At least some regional associations – in 
particular MOOSZ (the Hungarian Asso-
ciation of County Governments) find the 
ROP emphasis on human capital and adult 
education somewhat problematic. Their 
preferences would have been for more 
emphasis on regular (elementary) schools, 
especially in the poorer regions and sup-
port for both agriculture and the local 
economy – in particular through SME’s. In 
their view, while financing local govern-
ment projects is good, too much funding 
will be spent on local infrastructure and 
education, but not enough on SME’s and 
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employment creation. Further, though most 
analysts suggest there are few important 
differences between East and West in 
Hungary with respect to political decen-
tralization, MOOSZ proposed that Hun-
gary be divided into only 3 regions (in-
stead of the current 7): a Western, East-
ern and a Central region. This 3-tiered 
breakdown maps almost perfectly onto ex-
isting regional economic contours and 
suggests that regional variation in levels of 
economic development is strongly related 
to regional variation in interests. 
7) DISCUSSION 
One of the biggest obstacles to political 
decentralization and greater subnational 
regional autonomy is the lack of strong 
regional organization in Hungary. Regional 
associations themselves are not as actively 
engaged as they might be in pursuing po-
litical decentralization. Without greater 
unity and active engagement across the 
different regional associations, there is 
likely to be only limited movement in the 
direction of greater political decentraliza-
tion and regional autonomy. While EU 
funding represents an important incentive 
to the greater organization of regional en-
tities, the strong influence of central actors 
in the political decision-making process 
and the financial dependence of regional 
actors contribute greatly to the general 
increase in centralization. 
However, in Hungary there are likewise 
serious constitutional impediments to the 
introduction of far-going reforms of re-
gional institutional decision-making struc-
tures. For one, constitutional reforms re-
quire a 2/3rds majority in the Hungarian 
parliament. Now that Hungary has evolved 
into a more or less 2-party system, the 
ability to introduce constitutional changes 
is seriously hampered by the unlikely even-
tuality that any single party would control 
2/3rds of the parliamentary seats. Barring 
this, it would be necessary that either the 
EU pass a directive requiring parallel 
changes in Hungary, or that the two ma-
jor parties manage to iron out some kind 
of agreement. Though by no means impos-
sible, such agreements are difficult to 
make. Thus, while the electoral fortunes of 
individual parties may potentially provide 
them with incentives to favour stronger 
decentralization, due to the constitutional 
hurdle and the presence of an emerging 
2-party system, the requirement of cross-
party cooperation may ultimately mean 
that little to no cooperation is likely to 
ensue. 
Given the economic considerations noted 
above, further decentralization of real de-
cision-making power in Hungary is 
unlikely in the near future. For both eco-
nomic and political reasons, the two major 
political parties and other government ac-
tors have strong incentives to favour the 
existing status quo. At the same time 
however, to the extent that this continues 
to reinforce existing regional disparities, 
there is likely to be continued agitation in 
favour of greater regional autonomy. In 
this respect, there is at least the possibility 
that less advanced regions will feel em-
boldened by EU membership and will in-
crease their demands for regional auton-
omy. But at the same time, this must be 
measured against the need for and de-
pendence on national level resources. 
This analysis draws particular attention 
to the problem of finding models – both 
economic and political/institutional – that 
can adequately promote both regional and 
national level growth at the same time. 
This requirement is all the more important 
for less advanced economies – in particu-
lar due to the problems outlined by the 
equity-efficiency trade-off, as well as by 
the increasing intellectual dominance of 
Lisbon-type strategies and thus ultimately 
more centrist focused strategies of eco-
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nomic development. As far as the conclu-
sions of this analysis are concerned, it 
must remain unclear whether the political 
and economic dimensions of this debate 
pull in opposite or in compatible direc-
tions. Establishing complete regional deci-
sion-making autonomy – in particular with 
respect to economic development strategies 
– may lead to more appropriate and re-
gionally-appropriate models of economic 
development. On the other hand, it may 
also produce the opposite. 
CONCLUSION 
The advent of EU membership and the 
governance of EU structural and cohesion 
funding in Hungary has dashed hopes for 
a more thorough democratization of local 
governance and the withdrawal of power 
from the central government. Where some 
anticipated the rise of more powerful sub-
national entities and progressive political 
decentralization, this has not occurred. 
Most agree the political centre has been 
greatly strengthened by the confluence of 
creating EU NUTS II level regions, eco-
nomic development strategies that tend to 
favour the interests of the more advanced 
regions of Hungary, the centralized control 
of EU and state funding and compara-
tively weak regional organization. 
One of the principal obstacles to more 
successful regional planning and admini-
stration of economic development strategies 
is Hungary’s insistent centralism. The fail-
ure to grant more political and adminis-
trative authority to the regions – however 
ill-fitted to respond to the needs of 
county, city and local governments – is 
itself the cause of local-level lack of ex-
pertise and planning capacity. Presumably 
the only mechanism available for reversing 
this process is the creation of regional 
governments – whether based either on 
the current NUTS II foundation or on 
some more aggregated foundation. Politi-
cally however this is difficult to achieve. 
The constitutional obstacle requiring a 
2/3rds majority to change the regional 
electoral and administrative structure is 
almost unattainable – in particular given 
the current degree of political polarization 
between the two major political parties.  
New Economy models play a powerful 
role in determining this outcome. Govern-
ments in less developed economies in par-
ticular face powerful incentives to main-
tain centralized control over the expendi-
ture of EU and national-level funding in 
order to promote more cohesive economic 
development strategies. This may suggest 
that regional demands for greater decen-
tralization may be more likely in the more 
advanced countries and regions of Europe. 
For one, the more advanced countries may 
be more likely to allow the market to de-
cide how best to allocate resources. And 
for another, regional political units are 
more likely to be dependent upon the cen-
tral government is less advanced states. 
Consequently, national level strategies 
will not likely respond adequately to sub-
national regional needs and interests. 
Faced with a competing set of national 
goals, national actors are less likely to 
dedicate sufficient attention to regional de-
velopment agendas – in particular in the 
less developed regions. In part, the above 
analysis suggests problems of subsidiarity 
or difficulties in determining the appropri-
ate level of governance beleaguer national 
and regional level economic development 
strategies. Such problems are presumably 
exacerbated by difficulties in determining 
the appropriate scale from which to think 
about problems of economic development 
(e.g. supranational, national or subna-
tional). The same basic problems are du-
plicated at the regional level. Regional ac-
tors are more likely to emphasize subna-
tional regional concerns, potentially at the 
expense of national level considerations. 
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The central research question is to de-
termine when and under what conditions 
national governments are likely to delegate 
greater decision-making powers to regions. 
With respect to the Hungarian case, the 
central government faces strong pressures 
to maintain relatively centralized control 
over the future shape and direction of 
regional development strategies. Thus in 
important ways, the potential for political 
decentralization is strongly influenced by 
the interests of the centre. At the same 
time, however, Hungary lacks at least one 
element that has favoured the development 
of strong interests in political decentraliza-
tion in other parts of Europe: in particu-
lar, the less developed regions are based 
on distinct cultural or ethnic identities. Fi-
nally, the political-institutional structure in 
Hungary is not conducive to rapid politi-
cal decentralization. Both the constitutional 
hurdle and the high degree of political 
polarization generated by the emerging 
two-party system represent important ob-
stacles to more rapid political decentraliza-
tion. 
Finally, supranational pressures further 
encourage national governments to re-
centralize political and economic control. 
With mixed signals coming from the EU, 
national governments in Hungary and 
other new member states are clearly at 
liberty to organize the management of EU 
SCF funding as they see fit. Though re-
gional operative programs are gradually 
gaining in importance, the central state-
dominated level clearly plays the central 
role in Hungary and is likely to do so for 
some time to come. At the same time, one 
of the potential consequences of this de-
gree of centralization is the continuing rise 
in regional economic disparities. This is 
likely to produce the groundwork for fu-
ture initiatives toward greater political de-
centralization and regional autonomy. Thus 
while the New Economy and the incentives 
it creates toward greater centralization of 
political control over economic manage-
ment pose the principal obstacle to greater 
subnational regionalism, this may provide 
the future motivation for its revival. 
 
* * * * * 
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